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Abstract
This paper examines several monotonicity properties of value-type interval solu-
tions on the class of convex interval games and focuses on the Dutta-Ray (DR) solution
for such games. Well known properties for the classical DR solution are extended to
the interval setting. In particular, it is proved that the interval DR solution of a
convex interval game belongs to the interval core of that game and Lorenz dominates
each other interval core element. Consistency properties of the interval DR solution in
the sense of Davis-Maschler and of Hart-Mas-Colell are veriﬁed. An axiomatic char-
acterization of the interval DR solution on the class of convex interval games with the
help of bilateral Hart-Mas-Colell consistency and the constrained egalitarianism for
two-person interval games is given.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C71
Keywords: cooperative interval games, convex games, the constrained egalitarian
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1 Introduction
Cooperative interval games are introduced and studied in Alparslan G¨ ok, Miquel and Tijs
(2008) and Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs (2008a,b), where the interval core plays a
central role. Such games model situations with cooperation with incomplete information
of agents and of their coalitions about the payoﬀs they can obtain for sure.
However, there are many real-life situations in which people or businesses are uncer-
tain about their coalitional payoﬀs. Situations with uncertain payoﬀs in which the agents
cannot await the realizations of their coalition payoﬀs cannot be modeled according to
classical game theory. Several models that are useful to handle uncertain payoﬀs exist
in the game theory literature. We refer here to chance-constrained games (Charnes and
Granot (1973)), cooperative games with stochastic payoﬀs (Suijs et al. (1999)), cooper-
ative games with random payoﬀs (Timmer, Borm and Tijs (2005)). In all these models
stochastics plays an important role.
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1This paper deals with a model of cooperative games where only bounds for payoﬀs of
coalitions are known with certainty. Such games are called cooperative interval games.
Formally, a cooperative interval game in coalitional form (Alparslan G¨ ok, Miquel and
Tijs (2008)) is an ordered pair hN,wi where N = {1,2,...,n} is the set of players, and
w : 2N → I(R) is the characteristic function such that w(∅) = [0,0], where I(R) is the set
of all nonempty, compact intervals in R. For each S ∈ 2N, the worth set (or worth interval)
w(S) of the coalition S in the interval game hN,wi is of the form [w(S),w(S)]. We denote
by IGN the family of all interval games with player set N. Note that if all the worth
intervals are degenerate intervals, i.e. w(S) = w(S) for each S ∈ 2N, then the interval
game hN,wi corresponds in a natural way to the classical cooperative game hN,vi where
v(S) = w(S) for all S ∈ 2N. Some classical TU-games associated with an interval game
w ∈ IGN will play a key role, namely the border games hN,wi, hN,wi and the length game
< N,|w| >, where |w|(S) = w(S) − w(S) for each S ∈ 2N. Note that w = w + |w|. An
interval solution concept F on IGN is a map assigning to each interval game hN,wi ∈ IGN
a set of n-dimensional vectors whose components belong to I(R). We denote by I(R)N
the set of all such interval payoﬀ vectors. Cooperative interval games are very suitable
to describe real-life situations in which people or ﬁrms that consider cooperation have to
sign a contract when they cannot pin down the attainable coalition payoﬀs, knowing with
certainty only their lower and upper bounds. The contract should specify how the players’
payoﬀ shares will be obtained when the uncertainty of the worth of the grand coalition is
removed at an ex post stage. In the following we brieﬂy explain how interval solutions for
cooperative interval games are useful to support decision making regarding cooperation
and related binding contracts. A vector interval allocation obtained by an agreed upon
solution concept oﬀers at the ex ante stage an estimation of what individual players may
receive, between two bounds, when the uncertainty on the reward of the grand coalition
is removed in the ex post stage. We notice that the agreement on a particular interval
allocation (I1,I2,...,In) based on an interval solution concept merely says that the payoﬀ
xi that player i will receive in the interim or ex post stage is in the interval Ii. This is
a very weak contract to settle cooperation. Therefore, writing down in the contact the
protocol to be used when the uncertainty on w(N) is removed at the ex post stage, is
compulsory. Such protocols are described in Branzei, Tijs and Alparslan G¨ ok (2008).
The ﬁrst step in the study of interval game solutions is to extend classical theory of
cooperative game solutions to interval games. For example, we can apply some single-
valued solution concept to both border games, and in the case when the solution of the
upper game weakly dominates that of the lower game, the corresponding interval vector
could be admitted as the interval solution, generated by a classical cooperative game
solution. Just in this manner the interval Shapley value for convex interval games was
deﬁned in Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs (2008b). The same approach can be applied
to the extension of set-valued solutions as well Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs (2008a,b).
Naturally, the problem of existence of such interval solution arises. In fact if for some
interval game hN,wi the characteristic function values of the lower and upper games on
the grand coalition coincide: w(N) = w(N), then for any single-valued classical solution
ϕ the (vector) inequality ϕ(N,w) ≤ ϕ(N,w) is impossible, and this approach cannot be
applied to the extension of the solution ϕ to the interval game hN,wi.
It is clear that the possibility of the extension of a classical cooperative game solution
to interval games depends both on the class of interval games into consideration and on
monotonicity properties of the classical cooperative game solution itself. Thus, in the
papers Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs (2008a,b) the class of convex interval games was
2introduced. It turned out that the most known cooperative game solutions such that the
core, the Shapley value, and the Weber set are extendable to the class of interval convex
games (though, as for the classical case, they exist on larger classes of interval games).
This paper examines diﬀerent monotonicity properties of classical cooperative game
solutions on the class of convex games and with the help of these properties veriﬁes the
existence or not existence of the corresponding interval game solutions.
A special attention is devoted to the extension of the (constrained egalitarian) Dutta–
Ray solution (Dutta (1990), Dutta and Ray (1989)) to the interval setting. It is shown that
this solution exists on the class of convex interval games, belongs to the interval core, and
has the same monotonicity properties as the classical Dutta–Ray solution. The last one
has two nice axiomatic characterizations on the class of convex TU games both with the
consistency axioms: one uses the Davis–Maschler consistency, and another uses the Hart–
Mas-Colell consistency. It turns out that the interval Dutta–Ray solution has only one
characterization with the help Hart–Mas-Colell consistency, because the Davis–Maschler
reduced interval game may not belong to the class of convex interval games.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we recall basic deﬁnitions, notations
and results on (convex) interval games. In Section 3 we recall the known monotonicity
properties of TU game solutions and connect them with the existence of the corresponding
generated interval solutions and the inheritance by them of the monotonicity properties. In
Section 4 we prove that the interval Dutta-Ray solution of a convex interval game belongs
to the interval core of the game. The Lorenz domination on the product vector set is
determined and it is shown that the interval Dutta–Ray solution Lorenz dominates each
other interval core element. Section 5 provides an axiomatic characterization of the Dutta-
Ray solution for convex interval games. We conclude in Section 6 with remarks about
alternative ways to deﬁne and axiomatically characterize the (Dutta-Ray) constrained
egalitarian solution on the class of convex interval games.
2 Deﬁnitions and Notation
An interval game is a triple hN,(w,w)i where N is a ﬁnite set of players, w,w : 2N → R
are a lower and a upper characteristic functions, respectively, such that for each coalition
S ⊂ N, w(S) ≤ w(S). The TU games hN,wi,hN,wi are called the lower and the upper
games of the interval game hN,(w,w)i, respectively.
Let GN be an arbitrary class of TU games with the player set N. Further we denote by
IGN the class of interval games with the player set N such that for any hN,(w,w)i ∈ IGN
both the lower and upper games hN,wi,hN,wi belong to the class GN.
Denote by X(N,w),X(N,w) the sets of feasible payoﬀ vectors of the lower and upper
games, and by Y (N,w),Y (N,w) the sets of eﬃcient payoﬀ vectors, respectively:
X(N,w) = {x ∈ RN |
P
i∈N xi ≤ w(N)},
X(N,w) = {x ∈ RN |
P
i∈N xi ≤ w(N)},
Y (N,w) = {x ∈ X(N,w)|
P
i∈N xi = w(N)},
Y (N,w) = {x ∈ X(N,w)|
P
i∈N xi = w(N)},
Deﬁnition 1 A single-valued solution (value) φ for a class IGN of interval games is a map-
ping assigning to each interval game hN,(w,w)i ∈ IG0
N a pair of vectors φ(N,(w,w)) =
(x,y) ∈ R2n such that x ∈ X(N,w),y ∈ X(N,w) and x ≤ y.
3Deﬁnition 2 An interval value φ on a class of interval games IGN is generated by a TU
game value ϕ if
φ(N,(w,w)) = (ϕ(N,w),ϕ(N,w)). (1)
Equality (1) implies that the inequality
ϕ(N,w) ≤ ϕ(N,w) (2)
should hold, and, hence, not all TU game values can be extended to the generated interval
values, and even if a value can be extended, then only for some special classes of TU and
interval games.
In the sequel we consider only interval values generated by some known TU game
values.
Consider the class Gc
N of convex TU games with a ﬁnite set of players N, Deﬁne the
class IGc
N of convex interval games with the universal set of players N by the following
way:
hN,(w,w)i ∈ IGc
N ⇐⇒ hN,wi,hN,wi,hN,w−wi ∈ Gc
N and w(S) ≤ w(S) for all S ⊂ N.
Given a vector x ∈ RN and a coalition S ⊂ N, by xS we denote the projection of the
vector x on the subspace RS, and by x(S) the sum x(S) =
P
i∈S xi.
The set of intervals of the real line we denote by I(R), and the set of |R|-dimensional
interval vectors we denote by I(R)N. An interval [a1,a2] dominates an interval [b1,b2],
[a1,a2] < [b1,b2] if a1 ≥ b1,a2 ≥ b2. An interval vector a = ([a1,a0
1],...,[an,a0
n]) dominates
an interval vector b = ([b1,b0
1],...,[bn,b]n]), a < b, if [ai,a0
i] < [bi,b0
i] for i = 1,...,n.
In the next section we show which TU game values for convex games can be extended
to the generated interval values and which ones can not.
By C(N,v) we denote the core of hN,vi, and by C(N,w) the interval core (of the
interval game hN,(w,w)i,w = (w,w):
C(N,w) = {(x,y) ∈ RN × RN |x ∈ C(N,w),y ∈ C(N,w),x ≤ y}.
We notice that this deﬁnition is diﬀerent than the usual one, which regards the interval
core as a set of |N|- dimensional vectors in I(R)N, but it is equivalent in its consequences.
3 Monotonicity properties of TU game values and of the
corresponding generated interval values
3.1 Existence of interval values generated by TU game values
In this section we consider the interval values on the class of convex interval games IGc
N.
Given a TU value ϕ for the class Gc
N, the existence of the generated by it interval value
φ on IGc
N, i.e. the fulﬁlment of inequality (2) is equivalent to the following monotonicity
property of ϕ :
Convex monotonicity (CvM). If hN,vi, hN,v0i, hN,v0 − vi ∈ Gc
N, and v0(S) ≥ v(S)
for all S ⊂ N, then ϕ(N,v0) ≥ ϕ(N,v).
Let us compare this property with other known monotonicity properties of TU game
solutions1:
1The deﬁnitions of the properties are given for arbitrary classes of TU games, so they are not indicated.
4Aggregate monotonicity If v0(N) > v(N) and v0(S) = v(S) for all S $ N, then
ϕ(N,v0) ≥ ϕ(N,v).
Coalitional monotonicity. For each coalition S ⊂ N, v0(S) > v(S) and v0(T) = v(T)
for all T 6= S imply ϕi(N,v0) ≥ ϕi(N,v) for all i ∈ S.
Contribution monotonicity (CM). For each i ∈ N inequalities
v0(S ∪ {i}) − v0(S) ≥ v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) for all S 63 i imply ϕi(N,v0) ≥ ϕi(N,v).
Weak contribution monotonicity (WCM) (Hokari, van Gellekom 2002) If for all
i ∈ N and all coalitions S 63 i the inequalities v0(S ∪{i})−v0(S) ≥ v(S ∪{i})−v(S) hold,
then ϕ(N,v0) ≥ ϕ(N,v).
Note that all these properties were deﬁned for games with the same sets of players. It
is clear that
CM =⇒ WCM =⇒ AM. (3)
Let us check where convex monotonicity is placed in relations (3).
Proposition 1 On the class of convex games Gc
N
WCM =⇒ CvM =⇒ AM.
Proof. Let hN,vi,hN,v0i,hN,v0−vi be convex games such that v0(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ N.
Then for all i ∈ N and S 63 i
v0(S ∪ {i}) − v0(S) ≥ v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S). (4)
If a value ϕ on Gc
N satisﬁes weak contribution monotonicity, then ϕ(N,v0) ≥ ϕ(N,v), and
ϕ satisﬁes convex monotonicity.
Let now ϕ0 be any value on the class Gc
N that satisﬁes convex monotonicity. Then for
games hN,vi,hN,v0i inequalities (4) hold, inclusively for those such that v(S) = v0(S) for
all S $ N, v0(N) > v(N), implying ϕ(N,v0) 6≥ ϕ(N,v).
Relations (3) and Proposition 1 permit to check for what TU game values for convex
games the generated interval values exist or not.
It is well-known that the Shapley value satisﬁes contribution monotonicity. Therefore,
there exists the interval Shapley value on the class of convex interval games (Alparslan
G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs (2008b)).
On the other hand, it is known that the prenucleolus and the τ-value on the class
of convex games do not satisfy aggregate monotonicity (Hokari (2000), Hokari and van
Gellekom (2002)). Therefore, the interval prenucleolus and the interval τ-value do not
exist on the class IGc
N.
The (constrained) egalitarian solution for TU games was deﬁned by Dutta and Ray
(1989) as the unique Lorenz maximal allocation in the Lorenz core. We call it the it
Dutta–Ray solution (DR). This solution can be empty, its existence was proved in the same
paper for the class of convex games. For each convex game hN,vi the Dutta–Ray solution
is the unique allocation in the core which Lorenz dominates all other core allocations.
This solution was characterized on the class of convex games by Dutta (1990) in two ways,
both using consistency: he proved that the DR is the unique solution satisfying constrained
egalitarianism (CE) for two-person games and consistency either in the deﬁnition due to
Davis and Maschler (1965), or in the deﬁnition due to Hart and Mas-Colell (1989).
The Dutta–Ray solution on the class of convex TU games possesses many attractive
properties. In particular, Hokari and van Gellekom (2002) proved that the DR solution
5over the class of convex games satisﬁes weak contribution monotonicity, hence, by Propo-
sition 1 it satisﬁes convex monotonicity providing the existence of the generated Dutta–
Ray interval solution on the class of convex interval games.
The properties and a characterization of the interval Dutta–Ray solution will be the
main subject of the next sections.
On the other hand, it is known that the prenucleolus and the τ-value on the class
of convex games do not satisfy aggregate monotonicity (Hokari (2000), Hokari and van
Gellekom (2002)). Therefore, the interval prenucleolus and the interval τ-value do not
exist on the class IGc
N.
The last monotonicity property compares players’ payoﬀs with respect to solution
vectors in the initial game and its subgames:
Population monotonicity. If hN,vi is a convex game and N0 ⊂ N, then ϕi(N,v) ≥
ϕi(N0,v) for all i ∈ N0, where hN0,vi is the subgame of hN,vi.
This property assures the existence of population monotonic allocation schemes, (Spru-
mont (1990)). Recall that for a game v ∈ GN a scheme a = (aiS)i∈S,S∈2N\{∅} of real
numbers is a population monotonic allocation scheme of v if
(i)
P
i∈S aiS = v(S) for all S ∈ 2N \ {∅},
(ii) aiS ≤ aiT for all S,T ∈ 2N \ {∅} with S ⊂ T and for each i ∈ S.
We notice that convexity of v is a suﬃcient condition for the the existence of population
monotonic allocation schemes.
3.2 Inheritance of monotonicity properties by interval values
It is not diﬃcult to extend the above deﬁned monotonicity properties (except for convex
monotonicity) to interval values. For interval values we demand that the properties hold
both for lower and upper games. Let φ be an interval value for the class IGc
N of interval
convex games. The following deﬁnitions are the extensions to interval convex games of
the given above monotonicity properties of TU game values.
Aggregate monotonicity If hN,(w,w)i and hN,(w0,w0)i are interval convex games such
that w(S) = w0(S),w(S) = w0(S) for all S $ N, and w0(N) > w(N),w0(N) > w(N), then
φ(N,v0) < φ(N,v).
Coalitional monotonicity. If for interval convex games hN,(w,w)i and hN,(w0,w0)i for
some coalition S ⊂ N the following inequalities hold: w0(S) > w(S),w0(S) > w(S) and
w0(T) = w(T),w0(T) = w(T) for all T 6= S, then φi(N,(w0,w0)) < φi(N,(w,w)) for all
i ∈ S.
Contribution monotonicity (CM). For interval convex games hN,(w,w)i and hN,(w0,w0)i
and for each i ∈ N inequalities
w0(S ∪ {i}) − w0(S) ≥ w(S ∪ {i}) − w(S), w0(S ∪ {i}) − w(S) ≥ w(S ∪ {i}) − w(S) for all
S 63 i imply φi(N,v0) < φi(N,v).
Weak contribution monotonicity If for interval convex games hN,(w,w)i and hN,(w0,w0)i,
for all i ∈ N, and all coalitions S 63 i the inequalities w0(S∪{i})−w0(S) ≥ w(S∪{i})−w(S),
w0(S ∪ {i}) − w0(S) ≥ w(S ∪ {i}) − w(S) hold, then φ(N,v0) < φ(N,v).
6Population monotonicity. If hN,(w,w)i is an interval convex game and N0 ⊂ N,
then φi(N,(w,w)) < φi(N0,(w,w)) for all i ∈ N0, where hN0,(w,w)i is the subgame of
hN,(w,w)i.
From the deﬁnitions it follows that all these properties are inherited by interval values
generated by TU game values: if a value ϕ on the class of TU convex games Gc
N satisﬁes
one of the monotonicity properties, then the generated interval value φ on the class IGc
N
satisﬁes the same interval property.
In particular, since the Shapley value and the Dutta–Ray solution on the class of
convex games are population monotonic, we obtain that the interval Shapley value and
the interval Dutta–Ray solution are population monotonic on the class of interval convex
games as well.
This last monotonicity property provides the existence of interval population monotonic
allocation schemes (Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs (2008b)). Recall that for a game
w ∈ IGN a scheme A = (AiS)i∈S,S∈2N\{∅} with AiS ∈ I(R)N is an interval monotonic
allocation scheme of w if
(i)
P
i∈S AiS = w(S) for all S ∈ 2N \ {∅},
(ii) AiS 4 AiT for all S,T ∈ 2N \ {∅} with S ⊂ T and for each i ∈ S.
We notice that convexity of w is a suﬃcient condition for the existence of interval popu-
lation monotonic allocation schemes.
4 The interval Dutta–Ray solution on the class of convex
interval games
4.1 Properties of the interval Dutta–Ray solution
The solution CE of constrained egalitarianism on the class of two-person superadditive











2 < v({i}),v({i}) > v({j}
v({1,2}) − v({2}), if
v({1,2})
2 ≤ v({2}),v({j}) > v({i}).
(5)
Deﬁnition (5) shows that the CE solution assigns to each two-person superadditive
game the payoﬀ vector in the core nearest to the diagonal, i.e. to the equal share eﬃcient
payoﬀ vector. This solution vector Lorenz dominates all other vectors from the core:
CE({i,j},v) Lor x for all x ∈ C({i,j},v) \ CE({i,j},v). Recall that if we consider a
society of n individuals with aggregate income ﬁxed at I units, and for any x ∈ Rn
+ denote
by ˆ x = (ˆ x1,..., ˆ xn) the vector obtained by rearranging its coordinates in a non-decreasing
order, that is, ˆ x1 ≤ ˆ x2 ≤ ... ≤ ˆ xn then the Lorenz domination relation is deﬁned as





i=1 yi = I, we say that x Lorenz dominates
y, and denote it by x Lor y, if and only if
Pp
i=1 ˆ xi ≥
Pp
i=1 ˆ yi for all p ∈ {1,...,n − 1},
with at least one strict inequality.
The Dutta-Ray solution extends the CE solution to all convex TU games: it assigns to
each convex game hN,vi ∈ Gc
N the vector DR(N,v) ∈ C(N,v) which Lorenz dominates
all other vectors from the core:
DR(N,v) Lor x for all x ∈ C(N,v).
7Proposition 1 permits to deﬁne the interval Dutta–Ray solution for interval convex
games as a mapping assigning to each convex interval game hN,(w,w)i the pair of vectors
(DR(N,w,DR(N,w)). This deﬁnition can be done in the form of the Lorenz domina-
tion property as that for convex TU games. For this, ﬁrst we should extend the Lorenz
domination to sets of ordered pairs of vectors (x,y) ∈ RN × RN such that x ≤ y.
Let A = {(x,y)|x ∈ RN,y ∈ RN,x ≤ y} be a set of pairs of vectors, (x,y),(x0,y0) ∈ A.
We say that (x,y) Lorenz dominates (x0,y0), if the Lorenz curve L(x,y) Pareto dominates
the Lorenz curve L(x0,y0). Note that in a weakly increasing ordering of the vector (x,y)
deﬁning the Lorenz curve L(x,y), it may happen that xi > yj for some components i > j.
Proposition 2 For any interval convex game hN,wi = hN,(w,w)i ∈ IGc
N the interval
Dutta–Ray solution (DR(N,w),DR(N,w)) belongs to the interval core C(N,w) and Lorenz
dominates all other vectors (x,y) ∈ C(N,w).
Proof. Since DR(N,w) ∈ C(N,w),DR(N,w) ∈ C(N,w) and DR(N,w) ≤ DR(N,w)
we have (DR(N,w),DR(N,w)) ∈ C(N,w).
By the deﬁnition of the DR solution on the class Gc
N
DR(N,w) = x∗ Lor x, DR(N,w) = y∗ Lor y for all x ∈ C(N,w)\{x∗},y ∈ C(N,w)\{y∗}.
Then, by separability of the Lorenz domination,
(x∗,y) Lor (x,y) for any y ∈ RN and all x ∈ C(N,w) \ {x∗},
(x,y∗) Lor (x,y) for any x ∈ RN and all y ∈ C(N,w) \ {y∗}.
(6)
It is clear that relations (6) imply the demanded result.
The DR solution on the class Gc
N is covariant with respect to identical aﬃne transfor-
mations of players utilities. It means that for any game hN,vi ∈ Gc
N, any positive number
α ∈ R+, and arbitrary vector ¯ b = (b,b...,b) ∈ RN, it holds
DR(N,αv +¯ b) = αDR(N,v) +¯ b, (7)
where for all S ⊂ N, (αv +¯ b)(S) = αv(S) + b|S|.
It turns out that this property is extended to the interval DR solution even in a stronger
manner:
Proposition 3 For any ﬁnite N the interval DR solution on the class IGc
N is covariant
with respect to identical aﬃne transformations of players utilities, which may be diﬀerent
for lower and upper games: for arbitrary hN,(w,w)i ∈ IGc
N, numbers α,α0 ∈ R+,α ≤ α0,
and vectors ¯ a = (a,...,a),¯ b = (b,...,b) ∈ RN,a ≤ b, it holds
DR(N,α(w + ¯ a,w +¯ b)) = (αDR(N,w + ¯ a),αDR(N,w) +¯ b)),
and if the border games are positive, i.e. w(S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊂ N, then
DR(N,αw + ¯ a,α0w +¯ b) = αDR(N,w + ¯ a,α0DR(N,w) +¯ b).
Proof. First, notice that the pair hN,w+¯ ai,hN,w+¯ bi deﬁnes the interval convex game
hN,(w + ¯ a,w + ¯ b). In fact, both border games are convex, w + a ≤ w + b for all S ⊂ N,
and the length game w − w +¯ b − ¯ a is also convex.
8Similarly, it may be shown that hN,(αw + ¯ a,α0w + ¯ b)i is a convex interval games, if
w(S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊂ N.
Now equalities (7) establish the result.
Similar to classical TU games, given an interval game hN,(w,w)i we call the game
hN,α(w + ¯ a,w +¯ b)i, where α > 0,¯ a ≤ ¯ b, strategically equivalent to the game hN,(w,w)i.
For the case of positive border games the game hαw + ¯ a,αw + ¯ bi is called strategically
equivalent to the game hN,(w,w)i.
Recall Dutta’s algorithm (Dutta (1990)) for the calculation of the DR solution for
convex TU games: let for a convex TU game hN,vi, x = DR(N,v), and let the players be
ordered with respect to their decreasing solution payoﬀs:
x = (a1,...,a1 | {z }
T1
,a2,...,a2, | {z }
T2
...ak ...,ak | {z }
Tk
). (8)
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It is clear that for ﬁnding the interval DR solution we should apply the algorithm
for lower and upper games hN,wi,hN,wi separately. Then, in the general case, the cor-
responding partitions of the player set N may be diﬀerent for lower and upper games.
However, it is clear that if the lower and the upper games are strategically equivalent then
the partitions of N in coalitions whose players have equal shares corresponding to the DR
solutions DR(N,w),DR(N,w) are the same. The analogous result holds for the interval
DR solution:
Proposition 4 Let two convex interval games hN,(w,w)i,hN,(w0,w0)i be strategically
equivalent, and let DR(N,(w,w)) = (x,y) where
x = DR(N,w) = (a1,...,a1 | {z }
T1
,a2,...,a2, | {z }
T2
...ak ...,ak | {z }
Tk
),
y = DR(N,w) = (b1,...,b1 | {z }
Q1
,b2,...,b2 | {z }
Q2
...br ...,br | {z }
Qr
),
and a1 > ... > ak, b1 > ... > br. Then DR(N,(w0,w0)) = (x0,y0), where
x0 = (a0
1,...,a0


























1 > ... > a0
k, b0
1 > ... > b0
r. Moreover, x0 = αx + β,y0 = α0y + β0 for some
α0 ≥ α > 0,β0 ≥ β.
9Proof. From the deﬁnition of strategically equivalent interval games it follows that w0 =
αw + ¯ β,w0 = α0w + ¯ β0, where ¯ β0 ≥ ¯ β, α0 ≥ α > 0, and α0 > α only if w(S),w0(S) ≥ 0 for
all S ⊂ N. Then formulas (8),(9) give the result.
Monotonicity properties of the interval Dutta–Ray solution have been already discussed
in the previous section. Now we are going to deﬁne and to show consistency properties of
the interval Dutta–Ray solution.
5 Consistency of the Dutta-Ray solution on the class of con-
vex interval games and its axiomatic characterization
Consistency properties of a solution connect the solution vectors of TU games with diﬀerent
sets of players. More exactly, a TU game solution σ is consistent, if, given a TU game
hN,vi and a solution vector x ∈ σ(N,v), for any coalition S ⊂ N the vector xN\S belongs
to the solution σ(N \S,vx) (σ(N \S,vσ)) of the reduced game, obtained from hN,vi after
leaving the coalitions S. The characteristic function of the reduced game is deﬁned in
diﬀerent ways depending on methods of aggregating the values v(T ∪ Q) for T ⊂ N \ S,
Q ⊂ S and xS ( or on the solution σ itself) into a unique characteristic function value
vx
N\S(T) (vσ
N\S) of the reduced game.
Thus, to consider consistency properties of a solution, we should put into consideration
the classes of games with diﬀerent sets of players. Let N be an arbitrary universal set
of players, GN(IGN) be an arbitrary class of TU (interval) games with the player set N.
Denote by GN =
S
N⊂N GN, IGN =
S
N⊂N IGN the classes of all TU games and interval
games whose ﬁnite sets of players are contained in the universal set N, and characteristic
functions are deﬁned by the classes GN,IGN,N ⊂ N, respectively.
Dutta (1990) showed that the DR solution on the class of convex TU games Gc
N
is consistent in the deﬁnition of Davis–Maschler (max consistency)(Davis and Maschler
(1965)) and of Hart–Mas-Colell (self consistency) (Hart and Mas-Colell (1989)). We extend
the deﬁnitions of consistency of TU game solutions to the generated by them interval
solutions by demanding consistency of the corresponding TU game solutions for both
border games. Since the Dutta–Ray solution is single-valued both for TU and interval
convex games, we give the deﬁnitions of interval consistency in the deﬁnitions of Davis–
Maschler and of Hart–Mas-Colell only for single-valued solutions.
A single-valued solution φ on a class IGN of interval games generated by a TU game
solution ϕ on a class Gc
N is consistent or satisﬁes the reduced game property in the sense
of Davis–Maschler if for any game hN,(w,w)i ∈ IGN and a coalition S ⊂ N
(ϕ(N,w),ϕ(N,w))S = (ϕ(S,wx),ϕ(S,wy)), (10)
where x = ϕ(N,w), y = ϕ(N,w), hS,(wx,wy)i ∈ IGS and the characteristic functions of









w(T ∪ Q) − x(Q)










w(T ∪ Q) − y(Q)

for other T ⊂ S. (12)
10Moreover, the reduced interval games hS,(wy,wx)i should belong to the class IGc
N for all
S ⊂ N.
In deﬁnitions (11),(12) the characteristic functions of the reduced on S interval game
depend on the solution payoﬀs xi,i ∈ N \ S of players leaving the game. Hart and Mas-
Colell proposed another approach to the deﬁnition of reduced games where they depend
on solutions of subgames of the initial game.
A solution φ on the class IGc
N of interval games, generated by a TU game solution ϕ,
is consistent or satisﬁes the reduced game property in the sense of Hart–Mas-Colell if for
any game hN,(w,w)i ∈ IGN, a coalition S ⊂ N, it holds
(ϕ(N,w),ϕ(N,w))S = (ϕ(S,wϕ),ϕ(S,wϕ)), (13)
where the reduced games hS,wϕi, hS,wϕi ∈ IGc
N are deﬁned as follows:
wϕ(T) = w(T ∪ (N \ S)) −
P
j∈N\S ϕ
j(T ∪ (N \ S),w),
wy(T) = w(T ∪ (N \ S)) −
P
j∈N\S ϕj(T ∪ (N \ S),w),
where hT ∪ (N \ S),wi,hT ∪ (N \ S),wi are the subgames of the lower and upper games
hN,wi, hN,wi, respectively.
An interval solution ϕ is bilateral consistent in the sense of Davis–Maschler (Hart–
Mas-Colell) if equality (10) ((13)) holds only for two-person coalitions S, i.e. |S| = 2.
Since the given above deﬁnitions of consistency given above are applied separately
to lower and upper games, it may seem that the results about consistency of TU games
solutions can be directly extended to interval games. However, convex interval games
demand convexity not only of lower and upper games, but also convexity of the length
game. Just this property can be violated by the classical reduced games that does not
permit to extend consistency of the DR solution to the interval setting.
Proposition 5 The Dutta–Ray solution over the class IGc
N with |N| ≥ 4 does not satisfy
the Davis–Maschler consistency.
Proof. We give an example of three-person convex interval game whose Davis–Maschler
reduced interval games with respect to the DR solution do not belong to the class IGc
N.





3, if S = {1,2}
5, if S = {1,2,3},





3, if S = {1,2},
4, if S = {1,2,3},
0 for other S.
(w − w)(S) =
(
1, for S = {1,2,3},
0 for other S.

















Consider the reduced games h{2,3},wyi,h{2,3},wxi of the games hN,wi,hN,wi on
the player set {2,3} and with respect to the payoﬀ vectors y and x, respectively. Then
wy(2) = max{0,3 − 5
3} = 4
3,
wx(2) = max{0,3 − 3
2} = 3
2,
and we obtain wy({2}) < wx({2}) that means the reduced interval game h{2,3},(wy,wx)i / ∈
IGc
N.
Let us consider the Hart–Mas-Colell consistency of the interval DR solution. To begin
with we should return to the DR solution on the class of convex TU games Gc
N. Dutta
(1990) showed that the DR solution on the class of convex TU games Gc
N is consistent in
the deﬁnition of Davis–Maschler and of Hart–Mas-Colell. However, he did not prove that
the Hart–Mas-Colell reduced games of a convex TU game with respect to DR solution are
convex. The following example shows that, in fact, they may be not convex:
Example 2 N = {1,2,3,4}, v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N, v(N) = 6 + 3ε,
v({1,2}) = 4,v({1,3}) = 1/2,v({i,j}) = 1 for other (i,j) 6= (1,3),
v({1,2,3}) = 5 + 2ε, v({1,2,4}) = 5 + ε, v({1,3,4}) = v({2,3,4}) = 2.
Then for suﬃciently small positive ε this game hN,vi is convex, and DR(N,v) =
(2,2,1 + 2ε,1 + ε).
Consider the Hart–Mas-Colell reduced game hN \ {1},vDRi on the set (2,3,4) with
respect to the DR solution. Then
vDR({2}) = 2, vDR({3}) = 1/4, vDR({4}) = 1/2,
vDR({2,3}) = 3 + 2ε,vDR({2,4}) = 3 + ε, vDR({3,4}) = 4/3, vDR({2,3,4}) = 4 + 3ε,
and for ε < 1/12, it holds
vDR({2,3}) + vDR(v{3,4}) = 4
1
3
+ 2ε > 4
1
4
+ 3ε = vDR({2,3,4}) + vDR({3}),
implying that the reduced game h{2,3,4},vDEi is not convex.
However, it is possible to establish the fact of bilateral Hart–Mas-Colell consistency of
the DR solution:
Proposition 6 The DR solution is bilateral consistent on the class IGN for all N,|N| ≥
3.
Proof. Let hN,(w,w)i ∈ IGc
N be an arbitrary game, y = DR(N,w),x = DR(N,w),i,j ∈
N. Consider the reduced game h{i,j},(wDR,wDR)i on the set (i,j) with respect to the
DR solution. Then by the deﬁnition of Hart–Mas-Colell consistency and the population
monotonicity of the DR solution:
wDR({i}) = DRi(N \ {j},w) ≤ yi,
wDR({j}) = DRj(N \ {i},w) ≤ yj,
wDR({i,j}) = yi + yj.
(14)
12From (14) it follows that the reduced game is superadditive and, hence, convex. Similarly
it is proved that the reduced game h{i,j},wDRi and the length game h{i,j},(wDR−wDR)i
are both superadditive.
Let us show that wDR ≤ wDR. By Proposition 1 providing the existence of the interval
DR solution, we have
wDR({i}) = DRi(N \ {j},w) ≤ DRi(N \ {j},w) = wDR({i}).
The same equalities and inequality hold when we interchange i with j. At last,
wDR({i,j}) = xi + xj ≤ yi + yj = wDR({i,j}).
Thus, the reduced game on the two-player set {i,j} belongs to the class IGc
N. The
bilateral Hart–Mas-Colell consistency of the DR solution on the class of convex TU games
implies the equalities (xi,xj) = DR({i,j},wDR), (yi,yj) = DR({i,j},wDR) proving the
proposition.
It turns out that bilateral consistency ` a la Hart–Mas-Colell of the interval DR solution
together with the CE solution on two-person convex interval games are suﬃcient for the
characterization of the interval DR solution on the class IGc
N. To establish this result,
ﬁrst, let us prove an auxiliary one.
Lemma 1 If a single-valued solution ϕ on the class Gc of convex TU games is bilateral
consistent ´ a la Hart–Mas-Colell and coincides with the solution of constrained egalitarian-
ism on the class of two-person superadditive games, then it is eﬃcient and belongs to the
core.
Proof. First, let us show eﬃciency of ϕ. Let hN,vi ∈ Gc be an arbitrary game and let y =
ϕ(N,v). By eﬃciency of the solution of constrained egalitarianism, bilateral consistency
of ϕ, and the deﬁnition of the Hart–Mas-Colell reduced games for any i,j ∈ N, we have
yi + yj = vϕ({i,j}) = v(N) −
X
k∈N\{i,j}




where h{i,j},vϕi is the Hart–Mas-Colell reduced game on the player set {i,j} with respect
to the solution ϕ. From (15) it follows
P
i∈N yi = v(N).
The next claim is to prove that y ∈ C(N,w). We will prove the claim by induction in
the number of players.
For two-person games we have CE = ϕ and, hence, ϕ({i,j},v) ∈ C({i,j},v). Assume
that the claim is valid for all convex TU games whose number of players is less than |N|.
By bilateral consistency of ϕ, for every i,j ∈ N,
yi ≥ v
ϕ
{i,j}({i}) = ϕi(N \ {j},v). (16)
By the inductive hypothesis equality (16) implies y(S) ≥ v(S) for all S, |S| ≤ n − 1. For
S = N eﬃciency of ϕ gives y(N) = v(N) and we obtain y ∈ C(N,v).
Now we are ready to obtain an axiomatic characterization of the interval DR solution
on the class of convex interval games.
Theorem 1 For arbitrary universal set N the Dutta–Ray solution is the unique solution
on the class IGc
N satisfying constrained egalitarianism for two-person games and bilateral
consistency ´ a la Hart–Mas-Colell.
13Proof. In view of Proposition 6 only the uniqueness should be proved. Let ϕ be an
arbitrary solution on the class IGc
N satisfying the properties given in the Theorem, and
for an arbitrary interval game hN,(w,w)i ∈ IGc
N y = ϕ(N,w), x = ϕ(N,w).
Let us prove the equalities, y = DR(N,w), x = DR(N,w). It suﬃces to prove only
one equality, the second one is proved analogously. Note that by Lemma 1 y ∈ C(N,w).
Consider the following cases:
10. yi = yj =
w(N)
|N| for all i,j ∈ N. Since y ∈ C(N,w), this vector Lorenz dominates
all other vectors from the core, that yields y = DR(N,w).
20. There are i,j ∈ N such that yi > yj. Represent y in the form
y = (y1,...,y1 | {z }
Q1
,y2,...,y2, | {z }
Q2
...yl ...,yl | {z }
Ql
), where y1 > y2 > ... > yl,
and
DR(N,w) = z = (z1,...,z1 | {z }
T1
,z2,...,z2, | {z }
T2
...zm ...,zm | {z }
Tm
), where z1 > z2 ... > zm.
Then by bilateral consistency of ϕ and the deﬁnition of constrained egalitaranism, for
each i ∈ N \ Ql and j ∈ Ql
yi = w
ϕ
{i,j}({i}) = ϕi(N \ {j},w), (17)
where h{i,j},w
ϕ
{i,j}i is the Hart–Mas-Colell reduced game on the player set {i,j}.
By the inductive hypothesis equality (17) implies
yi = DRi(N \ {j},w) for each i ∈ N \ Ql,j ∈ Ql. (18)
Let us show that T1 ∩ Ql = ∅. In fact, equality (18) and population monotonicity
of the DR solution imply yi ≤ z1 for all N \ Q1, and yj < yi for such i and j ∈ Ql.
Therefore, if T1 ∩ Ql 6= ∅, then y(T1) =
P
i∈T1 yi < z1|T1| = w(T1), that would contradict
the membership of y = ϕ(N,w) to the core.
Thus, we have obtained the equalities
yi = ϕi(N \ {j},w) = DRi(N \ {j},w) = DRi(N,w) = z1 for all i ∈ T1,j ∈ Ql.
Consider the following possibilities:
20a. T1 ∪ Ql = N. If m = 2, then y = z, and the proof is complete.
If m > 2, then Ql = T2,∪... ∪ Tm, and for i ∈ Tk,j ∈ Tl,k < l, k,l = 2,...,m, we have
DRi(N,w) = zk > zl = DRj(N,w). Let k ∈ {2,...,m} be a number such that
zr > yl for r < k
zr ≤ yl for r ≥ k.
Such a k does exist because y(Ql) = z(Ql) and yj = yl for all j ∈ Ql. Denote Zk =
Sk
t=1 Tt.
Then by the deﬁnition of the DR solution and by the equalities yj = zj for j ∈ T1,
w(Rk) = z(Rk) = z1|T1| +
k X
t=2




14that again would contradict the membership of y to the core C(N,w), Thus, the case
T1 ∩ Ql = ∅,m > 2 is impossible and we return to the case m = 2.
20b. T1 ∪ Ql $ N. Repeat the procedure for the set T2. First, let us show that
T2∩Ql = ∅. As in the proof of the previous case, equality (18) and population monotonicity
of the DR solution imply yi ≤ z1 for all N\Q1, and yj < yi for such i and j ∈ Ql. Therefore,
if T2∩Ql 6= ∅, then y(T2) =
P
i∈T2 yi < z2|T2|, and this inequality together with the proven
equality y(T1) = z(T1) yield
y(T1 ∪ T2) < z(T1 ∪ T2) =
X
i∈T1∪T2
DRi(N,w) = w(T1 ∪ T2),
that would contradict the membership of y to the core C(N,w).
Hence, T2 ∩ Ql = ∅, implying that for any i ∈ T2,j ∈ Ql
yi = ϕ(N \ {j},w) = DRi(N \ {j},w) = DRi(N,w) = z2,
and we obtain the equality zT2 = yT2. If m = 3, then the process ﬁnished and z = y. If
m > 3, then we again repeat the procedure, and in the (m − 1)-th step we obtain y = z,
that completes the proof.
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